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The Obligation to Defend
And Some Related Problems
By LESLIE L. Roos*
IN EVERY policy of liability insurance there will be found a clause
in the insuring agreements generally providing that "as respects such
insurance as is afforded by the terms of this policy, the company shall
defend in his name and behalf any suit against the insured alleging (a
claim covered by the policy) and seeking damages on account thereof
even if such suit is groundless, false, or fraudulent; but the company
may make such investigation, negotiation and settlement of any claim
or suit as it deems expedient." This clause gives the company the right
to control the settlement of claims and the litigation resulting therefrom and imposes upon it the correlative obligation to furnish at its
own expense an attorney selected by it to defend its insured. The insured is required to cooperate with the company in the defense of the
claim as the obligation to defend and the right to control go hand in
hand. It has generally been assumed that the company is obligated
only to defend those actions with respect to which, in the event of an
adverse judgment, it would be obliged under the coverage provided
to indemnify the assured. What are the tests for determining whether
or not the claim is one which is covered by the policy? What risks
does the company run in refusing to defend a claim where doubt as to
coverage exists? With what ethical problems is the attorney retained
by the company confronted where it does defend such a doubtful claim?
Risks Involved in Refusing to Defend
The company is faced with a difficult choice when the problem
arises. In at least one California decision the court frankly stated that
where "semantically permissible"' it would interpret an insurance policy to afford coverage. An insurance company which refuses to defend
a claim made against its insured upon the grounds that the claim does
not fall within its coverage, acts at its peril. If it makes an incorrect
decision, the consequences are serious. The caliber of the defense
* A.B. 1934, Stanford University; LL.B. 1937, Harvard University; member, San
Francisco and California bars; American Bar Association.
1 Continental Cas. Co. v. Phoenix Constr. Co., 46 Cal. 2d 423, 437, 296 P.2d 801,
809 (1956).
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provided by the insured personally may be inadequate and the company has given up its right to control the defense. If the insured is
without funds he may not even put up a defense. If the company has
guessed wrong, it may ultimately have to pay a judgment considerably
larger than it would have had to pay had it defended through its own
counsel. Whether the defense provided by the insured was successful
or unsuccessful, the company will be liable for his attorney's fees and
defense costs. 2 The insured may settle the case and the company will
be obligated to reimburse him for any reasonable settlement.3
If, on the other hand, the company assumes the defense without
properly protecting its rights (of which more anon) it will be held to
have waived or to be estopped from asserting later the defense of noncoverage. 4 However, the company may adequately protect itself by
entering into a so-called "non-waiver" or "reservation of rights" agreement with the insured provided it obtains his express or implied consent.5 However, the insured may expressly refuse to agree to the
reservation, in which case the company is forced to elect whether to
defend and thereby waive possible defenses including non-coverage,
or to refuse to defend and stand the consequences if it is ultimately
held to have guessed incorrectly."

The Test to Determine Coverage
What is the test to answer the question of coverage or no coverage?
The general rule is that the factual allegations of the complaint are to
be analyzed and if the gravamen of the cause of action states a claim
within the coverage provisions of the policy, then the company owes
a duty to defend the insured, but not otherwise.7
That inroads would be made upon this rule which would not be to
the liking of the insurance industry was apparent in Ritchie v. Anchor
Cas. Co.,8 where the court stated: 9
2

Arenson v. National Auto. & Cas. Ins. Co., 48 Cal. 2d 528, 310 P.2d 961 (1957).

3 Walters v. American Ins. Co., 185 Cal. App. 2d 776, 8 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1960).
429A Aw. JuR. Insurance § 1465 (1960); see Sears v. Illinois Indem. Co., 121 Cal.
App. 211, 9 P.2d 245 (1932).
5 Note, 68 HAnv. L. hEv. 1436 (1955); 2 STAr. L. Ru. 383 (1950).
6 Schmidt v. National Auto. & Cas. Ins. Co., 207 F.2d 301 (8th Cir. 1953); Hawkeye Cas. Co. v. Stover, 154 Neb. 466, 48 N.W.2d 623, 50 A.L.R.2d 463 (1951).
7
Remmer v. Glens Falls Indem. Co., 140 Cal. App. 2d 84, 295 P.2d 19 (1956);
Lamb v. Belt Cas. Co., 3 Cal. App. 2d 624, 40 P.2d 311 (1935); Greer-Robbins v.
Pacific Sur. Co., 37 Cal. App. 540, 174 Pac. 110 (1918).
8 135 Cal. App. 2d 245, 286 P.2d 1000 (1955).
9 Id. at 250, 286 P.2d at 1003-04.
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Respondent contends and we agree, that the insurer's obligation to
defend is measured by the terms of the insurance policy and the
pleading of the claimant who sues the insured ...
Examination of the pleading reveals that it does factually allege
an accident though it does not use that word. The draftsman of a
complaint against the insured is not interested in the question of
coverage which later arises between insurer and insured. He chooses
such theory as best serves his purpose; if it be breach of contract
rather than negligent performance of contract, he chooses the former;
if it be negligence rather than warranty he alleges negligence; if he
happens to choose warranty it may be an express one or one implied.
And when the question later arises under an insurance policy as to
what the facts alleged in the complaint do spell, . . . for instance,
whether they aver an accident, . . . the complaint must be taken by

its four corners and the facts arrayed in a complete pattern without
regard to niceties of pleading or differentiation between different
counts of a single complaint. And the ultimate question is whether
the facts alleged do fairly apprise the insurer that plaintiff is suing
the insured upon an occurrence which, if his allegations are true,
gives rise to liability of insurer to insured under the terms of the policy.
It is settled that "in case of doubt such doubt ought to be resolved in the insured's favor." . . . In the Pow-Well case, which

depended upon a showing of an accident arising out of a plumber's
operations, the court said with reference to a complaint leaving the
matter in doubt: "In such a situation, it would seem to be the duty
of the insurer to defend, if there is, potentially, a case under the negligence complaint, within the coverage of the policy. If, under the
negligence complaint, a claim could be proved, which the insurer
must pay, the duty to defend arises."
It was always clear that where the allegations in the complaint were
ambiguous or open to two interpretations, one within and one without
the policy, the doubt would be resolved against the company,10 and
that where the complaint alleged two causes of action, one of which
was within the coverage of the policy and the other without, the company was bound to defend, at least until it appeared that the claim
was not covered. 1 Where the complaint alleges facts outside the policy

but the company knows or could find out that the true facts present
a claim which is covered by the policy, there is a conflict of authority
12
on the obligation to defend.

29A AM. JuR. Insurance § 1454 (1960).
11 E.g., Lee v. Aetna Gas. & Sur. Co., 178 F,2d 750 (2d Cir. 1949); 50 A.L.R.2d
506-07; 41 A.L.R.2d 434-35.
12 Compare Hardware Mut. Gas. Co. v. Hilderbrandt, 119 F.2d 291 (10th Cir.
1941), with Goldberg v. Lumber Mut. Gas. Ins. Co., 297 N.Y. 148, 77 N.E.2d 131
(1948), 50 A.L.R.2d 498. Where the complaint alleges facts which would be within the
policy but the known facts negate coverage the claim probably must be defended under
the "groundless, false or fraudulent" clause: United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Yazoo
Cooperage Co., 157 Miss. 27, 127 So. 579 (1930).
10
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Firco and Walters-Two Unusual California Cases
It is, however, extremely doubtful that anyone anticipated two
extraordinary California decisions. Firco, Inc. v. Firemen's Fund Ins.
Co.'3 concerned an action commenced against Firco by Pacific Lumber
Company alleging that Firco had entered upon the lumber company's
lands and "maliciously, wantonly, and without leave" removed several
hundred feet of redwood and Douglas fir trees from the lumber company's land. The complaint prayed for treble damages. Since a wilful
and malicious cause of action was alleged, the company understandably, refused to defend. Firco commenced an action for declaratory
relief. A judgment for the defendant company was reversed on appeal
and the supreme court denied a hearing. The district court of appeal
completely abandoned the "allegations of the complaint test" without
saying so and cited none of the earlier cases which established this
rule in California. The complaint filed by Pacific Lumber Company
was neither uncertain nor ambiguous. Nor did the court indicate that
the true facts, irrespective of the lumber company's allegations, fell
within the policy coverage. The court makes no reference to section
533 of the Insurance Code, which provides that "An insurer is not
liable for a loss caused by a wilful act of the insured." This section
codifies the general rule that an insurance policy purporting to indemnify the assured against liability due to his own wilful wrong is void
as against public policy. 14 Without citation of any authority whatsoever, the court found that the obligation to defend was owed since: 15
Under our liberal rules of pleading it is settled that if the facts alleged
in a complaint entitle the plaintiff to any relief, such relief will be
accorded, notwithstanding it may appear from the pleading or during
the course of the action that the plaintiff cannot receive relief under
his theory of the action.... The allegations in the complaint do not
justify a conclusion that respondent is not obligated to defend, for
it may turn out in the course of the action that the entry was unintentional and yet the plaintiff in the Humboldt action would be entitled
to recover at least the value of the trees taken. It must be remembered
that the attorney who drafted the complaint in the Humboldt action
is not concerned with the relations between the defendant and any
insurer that may be obligated to pay the judgment. He drafts his
complaint as broadly as he desires. In the Humboldt action, the
plaintiff's attorney cast his complaint in such manner as to warrant
the recovery of treble damages under section 3346 of the Civil Code
if he could prove that the nature of the wrong and the manner of its
infliction could be shown to entitle plaintiff to such damages under
the provisions of that section. But if it should turn out that the man13 173 Cal. App. 2d 524, 343 P.2d 311 (1959).

"Arenson v. National Auto. & Cas. Ins. Co., 45 Cal. 2d 81, 286 P.2d 816 (1955).
i5 173 Cal. App. 2d at 529, 343 P.2d at 314.
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ner of inflicting the wrong came within the exception provided in
that section, which disallows treble damages "where the trespass was
casual and involuntary, or committed under the belief that the land
belonged to the trespasser," then plaintiff could obtain only actual
damages.
In other words, the company was held obligated to defend because
it was possible, even though remotely so, that at some time during the
course of the trial the plaintiff might elect to change the entire theory of
his complaint (and a trial judge might permit him to do so) by amending to state a cause of action for negligence rather than for an intentional tort. Later cases either ignore Fircol6 or cite it without seeming
recognition of its implications. 17
Even more unusual is the case of Walters v. American Ins. Co., i"
an action for declaratory relief and damages. A claim had been made
against the insured for assault and battery. The carrier of his personal
liability policy refused to have anything to do with the claim since
assault and battery is an intentional act. The insured settled with the
claimant for 6,000 dollars in order to protect his credit reputation which
would have been impaired had a law suit been filed. He thereupon
brought an action for declaratory relief against the company. The trial
court's judgment for the defendant was reversed on appeal and judgment directed for the plaintiff for 6,000 dollars upon the ground that
the insured had acted in self-defense and was, therefore, not liable for
the assault and battery. A hearing by the supreme court was denied.
This opinion, interestingly enough, does not cite Firco and restates the
general rule that the obligation to defend is measured by the allegations of the complaint. It neatly gets around this proposition by stating:
"Here there was no action or pleading by [the claimant], whereby the
insurer's duty to defend would be measured. That question, therefore,
is open in this proceeding and should be resolved against defendant
on the basis of our interpretation of the exclusion provision."19 Would
a different result have been reached had the insured permitted a suit
to be filed rather than making a settlement before suit?20 The com16 Walters v. American Ins. Co., 185 Cal. App. 2d 776, 8 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1960);
Liberty Bldg. Co. v. Royal Indem. Co., 177 Cal. App. 2d 583, 2 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1960).
17 Columbia Southern Chem Corp. v. Manufacturers & Wholesalers Indem. Exch.,
190 Cal. App. 2d -- , 11 Cal. Rptr. 762 (1961).
18 185 Cal. App. 2d 776, 8 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1960).

19 Id. at 785, 8 Cal. Rptr. at 671.
20 Would not his credit have been equally impaired bad the company defended
under a reservation of rights stating that it would not settle or pay an adverse judgment
since assault and battery is an intentional tort? It is submitted that it was not the
refusal to defend the threatened suit that impaired the insured's credit.
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plaint, if filed, would have alleged an intentional assault and battery
with no reference to the defense of self-defense.
It has always been understood that the insurance company was
obliged to defend only those actions in which it would be obligated to
satisfy an adverse judgment in order to indemnify the insured. In the
Walters case, as has been pointed out,21 the company would not have
been obligated to satisfy an adverse judgment against its insured since,
had the plaintiff prevailed, the policy would have afforded no cov22
erage.
By applying Firco to Walters, one comes to the inescapable conclusion, illogical and unintended as it may be, that every assault and
battery case against an individual carrying the usual personal liability
policy must be defended by the insurance company until judgment
because somewhere along the line the insured may contend that he
acted in self-defense using no more force than was reasonable, and a
jury may believe him. It is submitted that a supreme court decision
re-examining the entire problem is required. If Firco and Walters are
the law in California today there is no standard or logical test for determining whether or not an insurance company is or is not obligated
to defend its insured where a doubtful question of coverage is presented, when the obligation terminates, and how the attorney retained
by the company may ethically protect his regular client.
Ethical Problems of the Attorney
Interesting ethical problems confront the attorney retained by the
insurance company in those cases where the company is defending a
case where coverage is questionable and it has not waived the defense.
For example:
(a) The complaint alleges two causes of action, one of which alleges facts within the coverage provisions and the other of which alleges
facts without the coverage provisions. Let us compound this problem
further by assuming that in complete good faith the attorney feels that
the best opportunity for obtaining a defense verdict is to emphasize
and seek to establish the facts which are not within policy coverage.
(b) If Firco is the law then "the duty to defend the action arose
when the action was begun and will continue until in the proceedings
in that case it certainly appears that the claim cannot eventuate in a
-1 Note, 49 CALIF. L. REv. 394 (1961).
22 Had the company defended and an adverse judgment resulted, would the insured
have been obligated to reimburse the company for its costs of defense? If not, wouldn't
at least the spirit of CAl.. INs. CODE § 533 be violated?
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judgment which the insurer is obligated to pay."23 Is the attorney
retained by the insurance company to attempt to withdraw at the conclusion of the plaintiff's case when it clearly appears that "the claim
cannot eventuate in a judgment which the insurer is obligated to pay"?
Or, is he obliged to put on a defense, then attempt to withdraw prior
to the submission of the case to the jury? If he attempts to withdraw
at any of these stages, has he violated his duties to the insured? If he
does not, has he violated his duty to the company by placing it in a
position where it will later he held to have waived or be estopped
24
from asserting the defense of non-coverage?
The attorney's duty is clearly set forth in Pennix v. Winton.2 5
In assuming to act as counsel for [the insured] . . . in this action,
counsel assumed toward [the insured] . . . the high duties imposed
by statute, (Business and Profession Code, section 6068) and by the
rules governing professional conduct (Rules of Professional Conduct,
213 Cal. page exiii), and whenever counsel had reason to believe that
the discharge of those duties would conflict with the discharge of
counsel's duties to the insurance carrier, it became the duty of counsel
to take appropriate steps to terminate the relationship.
It is easier to state this duty than to live up to it.26 Were counsel to
"terminate the relationship" would not his successor be confronted
with the same conflict? The use of separate attorneys for the company
and the insured has been suggested as a solution of the conflict question.27 This is of doubtful practicability since the attorney for the
plaintiff would undoubtedly object to more than one attorney for the
defendant examining witnesses and there would be a conflict as to
which attorney should control the conduct of the trial. Another impractical solution involving "the use of a three-party suit, in which
insurer, assured, and injured claimant can each press its own view"
2
has been suggested to cover the situation:
[W]here the claimant alleges that the assured injured him negligently and alternately that the injury was intentionally inflicted, the
assured would attempt to prove his freedom from fault while the
insurer might attempt to prove an intentional tort. Since it is likely
that the injured claimant will be pressing primarily for a finding of
23 Firco, Inc. v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 173 Cal. App. 2d 524, 529, 343 P.2d 311,
314 (1959).
24 See 29A Am. JTu.
Insurance § 1468 (1960); Note, supra note 5 at 1445.
25 61 Cal. App. 2d 761, 773, 143 P.2d 940, 946 (1943).
26 Certain things cannot be done, e.g., Pennix v. Winton, 61 Cal. App. 2d 761, 143

P.2d 940 (1943); Hammett v. McIntyre, 114 Cal. App. 2d 148, 249 P.2d 885 (1952);
O'Morrow v. Borad, 27 Cal. 2d 794, 167 P.2d 483 (1946).
27 Keeton, Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HAav. L. RLEv.
1136, 1167-76 (1954).
28 Note, supra note 5 at 1451.
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negligence, because only that ground will give him the right to collect from the insurer, the jury may make one of three possible findings,
each of which will bind all the parties.
This suggestion would require legislation, complicate the issues, bring
the existence of insurance in full view, and be time-consuming and
expensive.
The attorney representing the insurance carrier is the one primarily
concerned with the conflict of interest problem. It is believed that no
solution can be devised which will apply to all cases. If the insured
and the company are unable to resolve the problem between themselves and present a united front so that both may concentrate upon
winning the personal injury action, the least unsatisfactory solution of
a case involving doubt as to coverage is probably an action for declaratory relief to be tried prior to the trial of the personal injury action.2 9
Care should be taken to join the injured claimant as a party defendant
since, if he is not joined, the declaratory judgment will not be res judicata as to him.39
At best the problem is a difficult and vexatious one for all concerned.
29 See State Farm Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 2d 428, 304 P.2d 13 (1956)
where separate trials of the declaratory relief and injury actions were directed but the
order thereof left to the discretion of the trial court.
30 Shapiro v. Republic Indem. Co., 52 Cal. 2d 437, 341 P.2d 289 (1959).

